Abstract

Author(s): Mohammed Ghowse.M.E1, Mr. E.S.K.Vijay Anand2

The timing channel is a logical statement channel in which information is encoded in the timing between actions. A forceconstrained malicious node performed has been planned as a countermeasure to reactive active jamming attacks using logical timing channel. In fact, while a jammer is able to interrupt the information contained in the attacked packets, timing information cannot be jammed, and so timing channels can be broken to deliver information to the receiver even on a jammed channel. Since the nodes below attack and the jammer have conflicting interests, their communications can be modeled by means of game theory. A game-theoretic model of the communications between nodes exploiting the timing channel to achieve flexibility and secure to jamming attacks and a jammer is derived and analyzed. More specifically, the Nash equilibrium is studied in terms of existence, individuality, and convergence under best reaction dynamics. Also, the case in which the communication nodes set their approach and the jammer reacts therefore is modeled and analyzed as a Stackelberg game, by considering both ideal and damaged knowledge of the jammer’s utility function. Extensive numerical results are presented, screening the impact of network limitation on the system performance.